Article rewritten by General Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz [taken from Book 2 Military Leadership: Notes from the Experience of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Prabowo Subianto. Chapter III: Main Notes of Military Strategy Books]
“Sun Tzu said, ‘Know your enemy and know yourself, and you will not be defeated in a hundred battles.’ Therefore, I believe that all competent military leaders must study the experiences and capabilities of every army in the world. The experience of the Israeli army facing the surprise attack by the combined forces of Syria and Egypt in the Yom Kippur war is one example that I believe we need to learn from.”
If the Muslim community in Indonesia has Idul Fitri as the most important religious holiday, the Jewish community in Israel has Yom Kippur. Just as we celebrate Idul Fitri, the Jewish people in Israel also have the tradition of “going home” to celebrate Yom Kippur with their families. The policy of leave for going home is also given by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) by the Israeli government.
To take total control of the Suez Canal, the combined forces of Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack to take over the positions of the Israeli forces along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal on the day before Yom Kippur.
In the book written by General Jacob Even and Sumcha Maoz, two officers involved in this war under the leadership of Major General Ariel Sharon, we can read about the IDF’s complacency before Yom Kippur. The IDF leadership also repeatedly refused to believe the intelligence reports from the Israeli Mossad, which intercepted the radio communications of the Syrian and Egyptian forces. The IDF leadership joked that God would protect Israel during Yom Kippur.
The failure of the IDF leadership to take the Mossad’s reports seriously is evidence that “hope is not a good strategy”. Hope is not a good strategy. As a result, the Syrian and Egyptian forces succeeded in pushing back the Israeli positions and taking strategic control of the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula within hours.
In addition to the IDF’s failure, in this book we can also learn about the IDF’s success, especially General Ariel Sharon’s success in orchestrating the IDF’s counterattack, mobilizing Israel’s reserve components, and cutting off the logistics chain supporting the military operations of Syria and Egypt, allowing the IDF to overcome this attack.
